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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the sudden acceleration of 
Sino-Algerian economic relations and the resulting 
changes in the relationship between Algeria and the 
world. China’s presence in Algeria combines many 
interrelated features, which are not only distinctive, 
but contain their own logic and temporality: these 
encompass political, diplomatic, cultural, migratory, 
human and economic relations. This paper will 
mainly focus on the last category of relations; it will 
draw on statistical data, as recorded by international 
agencies, as well as data collected by national 
statistical agencies in Algeria and China. It will thus 
seek to improve our understanding of what is meant 
by “China’s economic presence in Algeria”.
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the sudden acceleration of Sino-Algerian economic relations and the resulting changes in 
the relationship between Algeria and the world. China’s presence in Algeria combines many interrelated features, 
which are not only distinctive, but contain their own logic and temporality: these encompass political, diplomatic, 
cultural, migratory, human and economic relations. This paper will mainly focus on the last category of relations; 
it will draw on statistical data, as recorded by international agencies, as well as data collected by national statistical 
agencies in Algeria and China. It will thus seek to improve our understanding of what is meant by “China’s 
economic presence in Algeria”.
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China’s economic presence in Algeria
Socialist Algeria has always maintained friendly relations with Maoist China, but paradoxically, it was only during the 1990s and the 2000s, when Algeria abandoned its offi cial ties to socialism, that the two 
countries began experiencing an unprecedented 
expansion in their economic, commercial and 
human relations. Twelve years ago, China’s share 
in Algeria’s foreign trade was insignifi cant. In 2013, 
China became Algeria’s number one supplier with 
6.82 thousand million dollars worth of imports, thus 
overtaking France (6.25 thousand million dollars), 
which had long held fi rst position. The European 
Union, however, still ranks as top trading partner 
for both imports and exports (Douanes, 2013:17). 
Excitement surrounded the Algerian media’s 
announcement of this event, which was portrayed 
as a competition between the former colonial power 
and the new global economic giant. France, whose 
dominant position in Algerian imports had been 
steadily reinforced ever since the opening of trade 
in the early 1990s, was now superseded by China. 
This breakthrough in imports might well be the 
most obvious expression of China’s increasing 
presence. However, it is rather diffi cult to assess the 
exact importance of this presence as there is much 
fantasising about it. From the moment the country 
became more visible, Western observers began to 
study China’s strategy in Algeria with increasing 
attention, as it introduced a renewed questioning 
going beyond the nagging issue of a rentier country’s 
failure to industrialise, diversify and create jobs.
This contribution will examine the sudden 
acceleration of Sino-Algerian economic relations and 
the resulting changes in the relationship between 
Algeria and the world. China’s presence in Algeria 
combines many interrelated features, which are not 
only distinctive, but contain their own logic and 
temporality: these encompass political, diplomatic, 
cultural, migratory, human and economic relations. 
This paper will mainly focus on the last category; it 
will draw on statistical data recorded by international 
agencies, as well as data collected by national 
statistical agencies in Algeria and China. It will thus 
seek to improve our understanding of what is meant 
by “China’s economic presence in Algeria”. 
FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT CHINA’S 
INVESTMENT IN ALGERIA
To assess the economic role that China plays in 
Algeria, we must examine the importance of both 
countries’ commercial exchanges, as well as the 
weight of Chinese direct investment in the Algerian 
economy. In this paper we will fi rst deal with the 
investment approach, as “foreign direct investment” 
(FDI) strongly implies an entrepreneurial 
commitment to the medium and/or long term in the 
economy of a country. According to the defi nition 
proffered by international authorities such as the 
OECD, FDI “…is an activity in which an investor 
resident in one country obtains a lasting interest in, 
and a signifi cant infl uence on the management of, an 
entity resident in another country. This may involve 
either creating an entirely new enterprise (a so-called 
«greenfi eld» investment) or, more typically, changing 
the ownership of existing enterprises (via mergers 
and acquisitions).” (OECD, 2003:157, box VI-I).
In 2012, the Chinese FDI fl ow in (Northern and 
sub-Saharan) African countries amounted to 
about 2.9 per cent of the total Chinese outward 
FDI fl ow and 0.18 per cent of the world-
wide global outward FDI fl ow1. Looking at 
Algeria alone, these fi gures are less than 0.3 
per cent and 0.02 per cent, respectively. The 
low level of the last two global fi gures 
should be viewed in terms of a long-
term African perspective: China’s FDI 
stock in Algeria accounted for 6.0 per 
cent of the total Chinese FDI stock in Africa 
in 2012. Among those African countries which 
have benefi ted from the Chinese FDI, Algeria ranks 
fourth, behind South Africa (fi rst), Zambia (second) 
and Nigeria (third). These four countries cumulate 
about half of China’s FDI stock in Africa. This fact 
highlights Algeria’s economic interest for China and 
may indicate a Chinese entrepreneurial and fi nancial 
long-term strategy. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
assumed that Chinese FDI is actually impacting on 
the Algerian economy. To gage a possible infl uence, 
Chinese FDI fl ows must be measured using the 
yardstick of the Algerian gross fi xed capital formation 
(GFCF), which is an indicator of net investment in a 
given country2. As FDI infl ows can fl uctuate greatly 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all statistical fi gures displayed in this paper 
are based on the author’s calculations from the United Nations 
Conference on trade and development (UNCTAD) on-line database 
(UNCTADStat at unctadstat.unctad.org) and MOFCOM (i.e. the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce) annual communiqués, Duiwai 
zhijie touzi tongji gongbao 对外直接投资统计公报 [Statistical 
Communiqué of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment] (Pairault 
Th., 2013:261-265). A more minute statistical account appears in our 
study of Sino-Algerian relations (Pairault Th., 2014:33-62)..
2 The gross fi xed capital formation, during a given period, measures 
the value of net additions to fi xed assets (less disposals) but without 
deducting the depreciation of fi xed assets. It is not a measure but a 
statistical “indicator” of (net) investment. 
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from one year to another, it is necessary to consider 
its average value over a given period in order to better 
ascertain its actual proportion. On average, from 
2003 to 2011, Algeria relied little on FDI to fi nance 
its GFCF (10.2 per cent as compared to the world 
average, 21.9 per cent), with a Chinese contribution 
(0.6 per cent) identical to the Chinese average for 
the world, but half the Chinese average for African 
countries (1.2 per cent). Hence, Chinese investment 
indicates China’s interest in Algeria, but is of 
marginal economic relevance for the latter and must 
be seen as part of a more general Chinese concern in 
investing abroad: oil supplies (cf. fi gure 1). 
The recent period has been marked by a clear 
commitment to reviving the oil sector by relying 
heavily on the expertise of foreign companies. In the 
process, China has received a certain degree of 
attention, which should, however, be considered in 
context3. Adding up areas prospected by foreign oil 
companies in association with the national oil 
company Sonatrach, the two Chinese companies 
(CNPC and SINOPEC) respectively rank fourth and 
sixth; it does not appear that they are particularly 
advantaged nor disadvantaged relatively to others 
major oil companies selected by Algeria. Areas 
conceded to U. S. companies account for one third of 
the total whilst those granted to Chinese ones account 
for less than a quarter. In other words, there has been 
a preference for China without it does call into 
question the pre-eminence of Western companies that 
handle more than three quarters of the prospected 
areas. Preference for China is also played down by 
direct investment fl ows as recorded by Algerian 
statistical services. Between 2000 and 2008, China 
accounted for 4 per cent of FDI entering Algeria and 
invested in the energy and mining sector. Thus, China 
certainly maintained an active presence, but much 
less so than Algeria’s main partners, such as the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Spain, which 
represent more than half (57 per cent) of FDI in this 
3 The statistical data given here are extracted from balance sheets 
published by the Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines, http://www.
mem-algeria.org/francais/index.php?page=bilan-des-realisations-2 
sector (Fachqoul K. and Th. Pairault, 2014:79-81). 
China’s presence in the oil and gas sector clearly 
refl ects the Algerian government’s will to open up 
to an old and faithful ally, whose growing economy 
offered great hopes of an expanding market for what 
was expected to be exceptional oil production, but 
which in fact proved to be disappointing. China was 
also undoubtedly a partner whose technical skills 
needed to be tested; this is probably why China was 
not put in charge of the most technically complex 
projects or the most expensive ones. 
FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT SINO-ALGERIAN 
TRADE
The total value (imports plus exports) of Sino-Algerian 
trade increased fourteen fold between 2003 and 2012 
(rising from 0.6 to 8.6 thousand million dollars). 
Negligible in the early 2000s, this trade has therefore 
progressively gained in quantitative importance: in 
2012 it accounted for 7.2 per cent of total Algerian 
foreign trade4. It is noteworthy that China’s rapid 
progress was due to two main factors. First, it was 
based on the originally low level of trade. Second, it 
was a result of the dynamics of Algeria’s economic 
opening, which benefi ted all Algeria’s partners. 
The balance of trade between both countries 
shows a growing defi cit for Algeria. This 
fact alone suggests that Algeria may well 
need China more than China needs it – 
at least from a strictly commercial point 
of view.
There is little to say about Algeria’s exports, 
for they consist mainly of crude oil and petroleum 
products. On average, from 2003 to 2012, they 
accounted for 98.3 per cent of the value of Algeria’s 
total exports and 99.2 per cent of the value of its 
exports to China. Seen From this perspective, it 
is obvious that exports are not Chinese specifi c. 
The structure of Algerian imports of Chinese 
merchandise does not differ very signifi cantly from 
that of all African countries: during the period 2003-
2012, on average, about 91 per cent of these imports 
were machinery and transportation equipment5
(51 per cent) and miscellaneous manufactured goods6
(40 per cent). Once chemicals products7
(5 per cent) were added, the proportion of all 
manufactured goods came to a total of 96 per cent. 
For Africa as a whole, these fi gures were 88 per 
cent, (44 per cent and 44 per cent) and 7 per cent 
respectively, making a total of 95 per cent. 
Different patterns may appear if Algeria’s imports 
4 All statistical fi gures displayed in this section are based on author’s 
calculations from UNCTAD on-line database.
5 Classifi cation: STIC 7.
6 Classifi cation: STIC 6 + 8 less 667 and 68.
7 Classifi cation: STIC 5.
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are examined in terms of the contributions 
of different categories of countries: this 
provides a comparison between China and 
other developing - and developed - countries 
(cf. fi gure 2). The forty- seven countries with a 
“very high human development” index according 
to the UNDP (2013:144) are considered to be 
“developed countries”, while the other countries 
are categorised as “developing countries” – this 
last category being divided into “China” and “other 
developing countries“. In 2012, Algerian imports 
from “developed countries” accounted for two-thirds 
(65 per cent) of the total imports of goods, whereas 
it was three-quarters (73 per cent) of the total in 
2003. Even if exports from “developed countries” 
to Algeria are still increasing, the proportional loss 
in market shares is China’s gain (12 per cent), and 
China’s gain alone, as “other developing countries” 
have not experienced any increase. The three groups 
of countries play very different roles, because 
the main goods they supply are not of the same 
kind. Imports from “other developing countries” 
are made up of 51 per cent primary commodities8
(food items: 40.5 per cent; fuel: 10.5 per 
cent). Imports from China are almost 
exclusively made up of manufactured goods9
products including chemical products (96.2 per 
cent).  Imports from “developed countries” show a 
comparatively more even distribution, as they are 
made up of 26.2 per cent primary products and 70.2 
per cent manufactured goods.
There are three groups of goods that deserve a  
more detailed analysis, as they are economically 
and socially sensitive:  Clothing10 (including 
8 Classifi cation: STIC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 68.
9 Classifi cation: STIC 5 to 8 less 667 and 68.
10 Classifi cation: STIC 26 + 65 + 84 + 851.
footwear), Telecommunication equipment11and Road 
Vehicles12. In 2012, clothing import statistics showed 
the opposite situation to that recorded in 2003, when 
the “developed countries” had 42 per cent of market 
shares and China had 30 per cent: in 2012 the fi gures 
were 29 and 43 per cent respectively.  On the 
other hand, “other developing countries” did 
not undergo any changes. This underlying 
trend should not conceal two facts: 
fi rst, the clothing industry in China is 
partly the result of the delocalisation of 
Western enterprises, and, second, the clothing 
industry’s share in the total value of Algerian 
imports is extremely low (2.1 per cent).  Hence, 
China’s share accounts for 0.9 per cent of the total 
value of Algerian imports. Throughout the 1980s in 
Algeria, well before the liberalisation of foreign trade 
and while local consumer goods were in short supply, 
of poor quality and limited variety, “suitcase traders” 
started ferrying contraband, fi rst from Europe, then 
from Asia, to meet the needs generated by rising 
incomes and the emergence of a middle class. In 
2009, Ben Simpfendorfer described the liveliness 
of the “New Silk Road” stretching from Chinese 
market towns to Cairo, Damascus, Riyadh and 
Dubai. Because of the policy of economic openness, 
the impact of indirect imports going through such 
commercial hubs may now be more limited (textile 
imports from Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates amounted to 10.3 per cent of 
textile imports from China in 2012). 
The entry of smuggled goods is not recordable, but 
their impact a fortiori can only be diminishing. 
Importation of telecommunication equipment is an 
11 Classifi cation: STIC 764.
12 Classifi cation: STIC 78 (including motor vehicles for the transport of 
persons and goods, motorcycles and cycles…).
Thierry Pairault
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equally sensitive issue, particularly as the Chinese 
telecom giant Huawei has recently been at the centre 
of legal proceedings in Algeria (Mira R. and F. 
Talahite, 2014:138-139). Obviously, the “developed 
countries” have lost their monopoly in supplying 
telecom equipment, but still remain the leading 
suppliers. As the fl ow of imports by country varies 
considerably from year to year, depending on the 
signing of contracts and the completion of projects, 
the average fi gures for the period 2003-2012 provide 
the best illustration of the respective position of the 
competitors: imports from China account for 28 per 
cent, whereas those from “developed countries” 
stand at 70 per cent on average. If looking at 
individual countries, France is certainly the biggest 
loser: it ranked fi rst in 2003, with a quarter of all 
Algerian imports of telecom equipment; in 2012 not 
only did its market share fall to less than two per 
cent, but the value of its sales dropped to one-tenth of 
its 2003 value. Conversely, the United States, which 
sold less than China in the early 2000s, gained an 
identical market share of about one third in 2012. 
Actually, the real competition may be between the 
“developed countries” themselves, not between these 
countries and China. The lists of telecommunication 
equipment approved by the Algerian Post and 
Telecommunications Regulatory  Authority13 do not 
show a marked preference for Chinese brands, but 
rather for Chinese-made products such as those sold 
under brand names like Alcatel, Ericsson and Nokia, 
for example. The Value-Added Export Ratio (i.e. the 
total domestic value added to the share of gross 
exports) in this sector reached only 57.4 per cent for 
China, whereas it stands at 87.9 per cent for the 
United States, 87.5 per cent for Japan and 70.4 per 
cent for  France14.
Algeria granted China a large share of its imports of 
road vehicles, to the extent that, in 2009, it became the 
fi rst market abroad for Chinese vehicles, according 
13 See www.arpt.dz/fr/downloads.
14 Trade in Value Added (TiVA) indicators by industry are calculated by 
OECD and WTO (stats.oecd.org). 
to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM, 
2011). Despite its present success and impressive 
progress, China has not yet dethroned the automakers 
from “developed countries”. In 2012, China won 
about 16 per cent of the market share of imported 
cars, but the “developed countries” still held almost 
two-thirds (65 per cent). Here again, France is the 
biggest loser in market shares, even if it is still able to 
keep pace with the Chinese, who are in fi rst position. 
In the near future, competition between car makers 
will not be restricted to imported vehicles, so may 
shift to locally manufactured cars.  In this situation, 
the French automakers may have somewhat of an 
advantage (see infra).
CHINA’S ECONOMIC PRESENCE
Sino-Algerian economic relations refl ect the overall 
dynamics of the Chinese economic expansion in 
Africa. China has entered the African market thanks 
to its ability to meet the urgent needs of these 
countries and, to some extent, because of its capacity 
to contribute to GDP growth. Meanwhile, China is 
looking for suppliers of raw materials (crude oil, 
mining products…). In Algeria, consumer goods 
imported from China have become an indispensable 
part of everyday life and have led to consumer 
patterns which would not otherwise have 
developed. These goods are not actually in 
competition with local production, which 
is virtually non-existent, since private 
capital is still essentially invested 
in merchant activities and fl ourishes 
especially in the wholesale consumer goods 
trade. Therefore, Chinese small businessmen do 
not really threaten the retail industry in Algeria, 
no more than Syrian, Tunisian, Egyptian, Moroccan, 
Turkish and other foreign petty traders do (Hammou 
S. and Th. Pairault, 2014:163). Even if the available 
capital is invested in the manufacturing sector, low-
end necessities imported from China are the key 
to keeping the cost of labour relatively low. Trade 
relations between Algeria and China are not really 
in competition with those involving the traditional 
partners either (Pairault Th., 2014:55-56). Generally 
speaking, developed economies and China are 
not in direct competition in their trade relations 
with Algeria: according to the merchandise trade 
correlation index, as calculated by UNCTAD15, the 
Euro area countries should have better opportunities 
in Algeria than other developed countries and even 
better ones than China (the indexes are, respectively, 
15 “Trade correlation index is a simple correlation coeffi cient between 
economy A and economy B’s trade specialization index. The resulting 
coeffi cient can take a value from -1 to +1. A positive value indicates 
that the economies are competitors in global market since both 
countries are net exporters of the same set of products. Consequently, 
a negative value suggests that the economies do not specialize in 
the production/consumption of the same goods, and are therefore 
natural trading partners”. See the statistical data provided online by 
UNCTADStat at unctadstat.unctad.org.
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the following: -0.358, -0.249 and -0.180). There is 
often speculation that China is making the most of 
the withdrawal of Western companies from Africa in 
order to promote projects that they have abandoned 
because of low returns (inter alia Hugon Ph., 
2009:164-165). For instance, according to Mathieu 
Pellerin, this may have been the case in the oil sector 
in Niger (Pellerin M., 2012). The facts may prove to be 
more complicated.  A recent audit by Ernst and Young 
found the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) guilty of bloated costs and undue charges. In 
2008, CNPC concluded an agreement with the former 
president, Mamadou Tandja, to lend money to Niger 
in order to launch operations at an oil fi eld near Diffa 
and to build a refi nery at Zinder. The audit revealed 
that the Chinese fi nancial package was infl ated by 
hundreds of millions of dollars, interest rates were set 
very high (market rates over ten years) and, fi nally, 
there was a kickback scheme involving 300 million 
dollars. The new Niger government renegotiated the 
contract, but did not obtain complete satisfaction. 
In neighbouring Chad, the government has been 
more cursory, shutting down the Chinese operation 
and accusing the CNPC of “blatant disregard of 
environmental legal standards”.In Gabon, the 
Obangue oil fi eld, operated by SINOPEC since 2009, 
was seized and handed over to Gabon’s state company. 
(Boisbouvier C., 2013a et 2013b; Nossiter A., 2013). 
Thus, things are not as simple as they seem at fi rst 
sight.
Another example may be useful in evaluating 
all the speculation about the withdrawal of 
Western companies. Ever since 2006, FAW (First 
Automotive Works – one of the main Chinese 
central enterprises – has been soliciting the 
Algerian government for an agreement to install an 
assembly line, but high tariff16 and land policies17
make direct imports of fi nished products no more 
expensive than local assembly. So it comes as no 
surprise that the presence of Chinese automakers is 
linked mainly to imports of Chinese vehicles and that 
their investments are limited to the opening of sales 
representative offi ces. That is also true of the Shaanxi 
Automobile Group (a publicly funded enterprise 
under the supervision of the Shaanxi province 
government), which had planned to set up an assembly 
unit in Sétif, scheduled to be operative in 2010, but 
in the end only opened a sales representative offi ce 
in 2011. Similarly Higer and JMC, too, only opened 
offi ces (Pairault Th., 2014:50-52). On the other hand, 
the French car maker Renault, which was said to be 
reluctant to invest in Algeria, fi nally accepted, in 
16 Custom duties on imported auto parts to be assembled are very 
high. An exemption of such duties could be why Renault recently 
(December 2012) accepted to invest in Algeria.
17 Access to industrial land is a major impediment to investment in 
Algeria. There is no shortage of land but there are poor land policies and 
ineffi cient institutions together with frenzied rent seeking competition. 
As a consequence, investors are discouraged by land price, opaque 
transactions, time-consuming procedures and extra-legal payments.
2012, the proposal to create a new production unit 
at Oued Tlélat near Oran (Chaal M., 2012). In that 
particular case, the Algerian government voiced a 
political choice (rappro¬chement between Algiers 
and Paris) as well as an obvious industrial preference 
(veteran carmaker versus newcomers).The revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) index, based on gross 
exports of motor vehicles and transport equipment, 
shows that France has a clear comparative advantage 
whereas China has a signifi cant comparative 
disadvantage in that sector: this index is 1.7 for 
France, but 0.3 for China (1.6 and 1.9 respectively 
for Germany and  Japan)18. Nevertheless, a year later, 
in December 2013, the Chinese automaker FAW was 
fi nally able to sign an agreement for a partnership 
with Arcofi na, a private Algerian group that is 
already marketing its vehicles (Kerri N., 
2013). Sometimes, the announcement of 
investment projects involving Chinese 
companies acts as a signal to Western 
companies and vice-versa  
On the 8th of October 2011,  in Algiers, the 
Algerian Minister of Health, Djamel Ould 
Abbès, organised a lavish ceremony to entertain 
la crème de la crème of Western pharmaceutical 
industries and announced a “mega-project” for the 
manufacture of drugs at the technopole located in the 
new city of Sidi Abdellah, near Algiers (Merabet H., 
2011). A few days later, Djamel Ould Abbès reported 
that foreign direct investment in the pharmaceutical 
sector amounted to 420 million dollars in 2011 – 
of which 320 million from European companies 
and 100 million from Indian, Egyptian, Jordanian, 
Turkish and Saudi companies (Ould Abbès D., 2011). 
A few days after that, Algeria and China agreed to set 
up a joint committee for the technical study of this 
“mega-project”, the purpose of which was to enable 
Algeria to eventually become «a hub for the Middle 
East and North Africa» in medicine, according to a 
statement by the Algerian Minister of Health, Djamel 
Ould Abbès (Haider K., 2011). Subsequently, the 
press never again mentioned any such prospective 
Sino-Algerian partnership. 
18 The revealed comparative advantage (RCA for short) is measured by 
OECD (stats.oecd.org). When the RCA exceeds one, the country is 
said to have a revealed comparative advantage in that sector; when the 
RCA is below one, the country is said to have a revealed comparative 
disadvantage in that sector.
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On the other hand, in December 2013, the French 
pharmaceutical leader Sanofi , whose Algerian 
market has long accounted for about 25 per cent of 
its turnover in Africa, undertook the construction of a 
plant in Sidi Abdellah which is to become the largest 
Sanofi  unit in Africa (Smati S., 2013). Therefore, 
speculation about the supposed withdrawal of 
Western companies and their alleged unwillingness 
to invest should be weighed alongside the capacities, 
as well as the (alleged or proven) behaviour, of 
Chinese fi rms and, last but not least, the industrial 
and political choices of the African partner countries 
– in our case, Algeria. 
In the 2000s, Algeria frequently appealed to 
Chinese contractors to implement the Programme of 
Support for Economic Revival (2001-2004) and the 
follow-up Economic Growth Support Programme 
(2005-2009) which were fi nanced by soaring oil 
revenues. The goal was to make up for the time lost 
during the 1990s, i.e. during the “black decade” 
marked by the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(1994-1998) that Algeria had to endure when oil prices 
were low and when the “struggle against terrorism” 
was dictating expenditure priorities and budget 
allocations. Once the legislation on foreign investment 
was liberalised, under the constraint of structural 
adjustment programs, Chinese contractors became 
very competitive, won numerous public tenders easily 
and took away the best part of the loot. Thus, China 
may have secured 80 per cent of recent infrastructure 
contracts in Algeria (Castel V. et al., 2011:5). Algerian 
contractors, mainly small and medium enterprises, 
cannot compete de facto with the large Chinese 
public groups (Souiah F., 2011:8). Thus, Chinese 
contractors have managed to get a step ahead by 
positioning themselves on the Algerian construction 
market at a time when Western contractors were 
fl eeing the insecurity and the poor business climate. 
The current Minister of Housing, Abdelmadjid 
Tebboune, seems to somehow regret past choices and 
now urges French contractors to respond to tenders. 
He adds that “the timeliness and quality required in 
the completion of our housing projects require us to 
explore new solutions.” (Lamriben H., 2014).
The entry of Chinese expertise and investment 
into Algeria does not automatically fall within the 
authorities’ sphere of decision. It may also occur via 
Western fi rms, without being checked by the Algerian 
decision-makers and sometimes even against their 
will, as in the case of Terramin Australia and Desertec 
(Talahite F., 2014:20-21). Formally, the disagreement 
between Terramin and Algerian authorities is said to 
have focused on technical issues, but in fact, it is 
the involvement of a Chinese partner that has been 
the bone of contention. The arrival of the State Grid 
Corporation of China as a shareholder of Desertec 
was not Algiers’ choice for its energy policy; 
however, the Algerian authorities had no alternative 
but to accept it. And what about Peugeot’s investment 
plan in Algeria, now that one of its shareholders is 
Dongfeng Motor (DFM) – one of the “Big Three” 
Chinese public automakers? It is worth pointing out 
that DFM has entered into joint ventures in China 
with Citroën, Honda, Kia, Nissan, Peugeot and 
Renault. This automaker may consider Algeria to be 
a bridgehead for securing its commercial expansion 
in Africa (Zhu G., 2014).
HUMAN ECONOMIC PRESENCE
The fi rst wave of Chinese migrants reached Algiers in 
the late 1990s. Some arrived as migrant workers, 
hired in China by Chinese enterprises engaged in the 
construction market in Algeria. Their contract once 
completed, some of them stayed in Algeria, where 
they opened small businesses. At the end of 2011, the 
total number of Chinese nationals on Algerian soil 
may have reached about 40 to 45,000 individuals, 
including migrant workers (the manual workforce 
recruited for a specifi c job), “expatriates” (managerial 
staff sent out on temporary assignments by their 
companies), petty entrepreneurs, shopkeepers and 
their families. Between 2005 and 2011, Algeria was 
the African country with the largest number of 
Chinese migrant workers, peaking at 49,631 in 2009, 
then falling to 36,562 in 2011, a decrease of 8,646 
between 2010 and 2011, mainly due to the 
migrant workers’ massive return home after 
the completion of the projects (cf. fi gure 
4). The construction of the West and 
Centre sections of the East-West 
Motorway, which is now completed, may 
alone have mobilised about twenty-two 
thousand Chinese workers (Michel S., 2007). 
The decrease in the number of Chinese workers is 
expected to continue with the completion of major 
contracts (Hammou S. and Th. Pairault, 2014:166-
168; Pina-Guerassimoff C., 2014:237-241). It was 
relatively easy for foreigners to settle down in the 
early 2000s, but later, administrative constraints 
(visas, work permits) become tighter – even for the 
Chinese, who fully felt their effects (Dridi D., 2011). 
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According to Tayeb Louh, then Minister of Labour, 
“[for major national projects], we resorted to foreign 
workers with work visas not exceeding three months 
and temporary work permits issued by the 
employment bureaux knowing that foreign workers 
must return to their home country upon the expiration 
of his work visa.» (Bouklia-Hassane R. and F. 
Talahite, 2010:127-129). Thus, in the 2000s, tens of 
thousands of Chinese workers arrived in Algeria, but 
only a few hundred of them could have permanently 
settled in the country – at least legally. This infl ux of 
Chinese migrants in Algeria could therefore only 
have been an interlude and not a groundswell, as 
some have supposed. This idea was widely publicised 
in Algeria and abroad, sometimes to the point of 
feeding the fear of a Chinese “invasion”.  However 
the only outstanding feature of this infl ux was its 
novelty in a country where there were very few 
foreigners, including Westerners, as a result of a long 
period of insecurity in the wake of the 1992 coup 
d’état. China’s presence here thus remains marginal 
when compared to Lubumbashi (DRC), which is 
“overwhelmed by […] an exhibition of Chinese 
symbols” (Tshibambe G., 2013:257) or to South 
Africa, where the Chinese “community” has been 
formed by numerous waves of Chinese migrants, the 
fi rst one dating back to the 18th century (Pina-
Guerassimoff C., 2014:238).  
In the 2000s, the Algerian government had to face 
two pressing issues: housing and unemployment – 
both causes of endemic social unrest. To tackle them, 
it adopted two distinct approaches: on the one hand, 
it relied on foreign companies to speed up housing 
construction; on the other, it promoted what in 
France is called “a social response to unemployment” 
(Bouklia-Hassane R. and F. Talahite, 2008:423-430). 
This policy nourished criticism against Chinese 
enterprises, which were accused of increasing 
unemployment by importing their own workforce. 
Bound by their tender specifi cations, Chinese 
companies had no choice but to import their own labour 
force in order to meet a commitment to maintain such 
low costs and short deadlines. The presence of large 
Chinese labour forces on construction sites was not 
at fi rst contested. Later, however, this was often seen 
as a refusal to provide employment for Algerians – 
although few Algerians would have agreed to work 
at wages and under working conditions such as those 
offered by Chinese enterprises to their own workers. 
The African Development Bank noted the Chinese 
enterprises’ low propensity for providing work that 
could absorb youth unemployment, especially that of 
graduates (Alden C. and F. Aggad-Clerx, 2012:14). 
This social discontent might explain why the brawls 
that broke out between Algerians and Chinese 
during the summer of 2009 in Algiers’ suburbs were 
interpreted as the anger and hostility of the young 
unemployed towards Chinese workers (Hammou S. 
and Th. Pairault, 2014:165) 
The Algerian government did impose a quota of 20 
per cent Algerian workers in Chinese construction 
projects. It is not clear whether this measure applied to 
all construction sites and, when it did, to what extent it 
was actually implemented (Dzaka-Kikouta Th. et al., 
2014:208; Kpetigo D., 2014:147-148; Provenzano L., 
2009). It is diffi cult to fi ght unemployment and at the 
same time to engage in the construction of housing. 
This should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
contract signed with Beijing Liujian Construction 
Corp (BLCC), a Chinese public company under the 
direction of Beijing municipality. BLCC was founded 
in 1958 and was authorised to recruit manual labour, 
skilled workers and executives to supply various 
construction sites abroad. BLCC was chosen 
to build 4,000 dwellings in Saïda. The 
agreement signed with the employment 
services provided that BLCC must 
recruit 3,724 local workers; in return it 
was allowed to hire 1,197 Chinese workers 
to ensure proper supervision. The agreement 
also stipulated that BLCC was required to 
promote training operations for young recruits 
in the various specialised sectors of building and 
construction. When the agreement was signed, work 
had already been in progress for almost one year. One 
year after its signature by both parties, BLCC was 
employing just 300 local workers, i.e. about 8 per 
cent of the fi gure originally put forward (Ahmed S., 
2013 & 2014).
Even if it is possible that there might be a refl ux, 
the presence of Chinese migrants and expatriates in 
Algeria is probably not a cyclical phenomenon, but 
rather fi ts into a basic trend in Africa that should gain 
momentum with ever closer Sino-African economic 
relations.
AN OUTSTANDING RELATIONSHIP
When compared to other Sino-African relationships, 
Sino-Algerian relations show certain distinctive 
features.  Two of them are particularly noteworthy: 
fi rst, the fact that infrastructure investment is self-
fi nanced and second, the purchase of military hi-tech 
equipment. Algeria does not seek package deals (i.e. 
an agreement including loans, aid and services) in 
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exchange for granting Chinese enterprises access 
to strategic resources – i.e. the infrastructures for 
resources strategy, often epitomised as the “Angolan 
model” of bartering (Corkin L., 2013). There is no 
detailed account of the whole process involved 
in awarding the East-West motorway contract; 
nevertheless, what we do know demonstrates the 
transformation in Algeria’s stance on the fi nancing 
of such infrastructure investment. The Algerian 
government was fi rst approached in 2003 by CITIC, 
a major public investment company under the direct 
supervision of the Chinese government. In 2004, 
both parties seem to have agreed to assess the costs 
of the infrastructure at 10.8 million dollars19 on 
the basis of studies conducted from the year 2000 
on by Western consulting and engineering fi rms, 
at the request of the Algerian authorities. Under 
this agreement, the construction of the East-West 
motorway’s three sections was assigned to a Chinese 
contractor designated by CITIC, who would be in 
charge of fi nancing the project. Moreover, it was 
understood that the Chinese consortium – made up of 
the fi nancier (CITIC) and the contractor (CRCC20) – 
would be paid in oil deliveries.  
The Algerian government challenged this strategy 
in 2005 when it became aware that higher oil prices 
made it possible to fi nance infrastructure investments 
with its foreign exchange reserves and, thus, to 
proceed by request for tender. The announcement 
of this procedural change seems to have been sorely 
received by CITIC which was originally to play the 
role of a mere construction manager, hiring the CRCC 
services. In the rehashed version of the project, the 
Algerian authorities asked the tender winners to act as 
project manager and thereby to assume responsibility 
for the project design. The panic seems to have been 
real: the Chinese consortium tried unsuccessfully to 
retrieve the studies conducted previously by Western 
consulting and engineering fi rms. What “rescued” 
the Chinese consortium was the low priority the 
Algerian government accorded to the quality of the 
work and, conversely, the high priority it accorded to 
the speed of its completion (fast-track EPC project). 
Consequently, the project design did not necessarily 
need to be completed before answering the call for 
tender, but as and when needed. The consortium 
thus had time to conduct engineering studies. 
Furthermore, the Algerian government, consistent 
with its policy of prioritising speed, even at the 
expense of quality, no longer required, in its fi nal 
version of the specifi cations, that bidders should have 
experience of completing a certain number of linear 
kilometres of motorway in countries demanding 
class A standards, such as European countries or the 
USA. The removal of this constraint meant that the 
19 This fi gure has to be compared with that resulting from the call for 
tenders which two years later reached 11.2 million dollars.
20 The China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) is the second 
largest contractor in China; founded in 1948, it is a public enterprise 
under the direct supervision of the Chinese government. 
Chinese consortium would not be excluded from the 
competition and, to some extent, that the previous 
promise would be respected. On the 16th of April 
2006, the Chinese consortium won only two of the 
three sections of the motorway (the West and Centre 
sections); the third section (the East section) was won 
by COJAAL, a Japanese consortium (He Y., 2011; 
El Kadi I., 2009; CACI, 2006). The experience of 
the CITIC- CRCC consortium in Algeria merits a 
few remarks. The completion of the motorway’s two 
sections in relatively good time certainly could have 
given a very favourable impression if it had not been 
for the poor quality of the work and the suspicions 
of corruption. We will not discuss the 
later issue here, as both partners (both 
the supply and demand sides of corruption) 
may be in the wrong. Furthermore, corruption 
on construction projects is a worldwide problem, 
which is not specifi c to China (Kpetigo D., 2014:146)21. 
Promoting the employment of nationals is not 
easy, as it is neither a mere matter of strengthening 
legislation, nor a problem of stricter enforcement 
of quotas. It is, indeed, the entire structure of the 
policy that must be re-examined, because calling 
on Chinese workers – in conditions that they are 
used to – is a sine qua non for low cost completion. 
Organising technology transfer, for the same purpose, 
is not an easy operation either. China has already 
experienced these problems when confronted with 
Western fi rms. Setting up vocational training centres 
funded by foreign fi rms may, wrongly, seem like a 
good idea: this type of solution cannot be reproduced 
indefi nitely – even assuming the teachers needed are 
available. Cooperation is probably a more promising 
path: here, the question is a matter of politics rather 
than of economic policy. These considerations lead to 
21 The 2014 Arachnys Open Data Compass reveals that “intrusive, 
bureaucratic and authoritarian states often perform quite well in 
providing open, business-critical data,” with China (20th) and Russia 
(23th) outranking United States (26th) when it comes to corporate 
transparency but performing worse than New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, Australia, France and Germany (to list orderly the top 5). 
See compass.arachnys.com/static /download/Arachnys-Open-Data-
Compass-2014.pdf.
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the second point mentioned above, the procurement 
of hi-tech facilities and equipment. 
The question of Algeria’s search for investment in 
industry, defence and technology was clearly raised 
by Ramtane Lamamra, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
when Wang Yi, his Chinese counterpart, visited 
Algeria in December 2013 (OPR, 2013). China is a 
long way from being the leading provider of high 
technology goods to Algeria (Pairault Th., 2014:60). 
The same is true of “engineering, procurement 
and construction” (EPC) contracts. The Japanese 
consortium was entrusted with the hardest part, 
technically, of the East-West motorway, and the 
Chinese consortium with the comparatively easier 
ones. As a result, the eastern part of the motorway 
will not be fi nished before 201522. The example of 
the two Skikda refi neries tells the same story. The 
modernisation of the big Skikda refi nery was handed 
over to the Korean company, Samsung, whereas 
the renovation of the smaller one was assigned to 
a subsidiary of the Chinese oil company CNPC 
(Fachqoul K. and Th. Pairault, 2014:78). Algeria’s 
acquisition of hi-tech products and equipment 
is driven by sheer pragmatism: buy them from 
whichever country manufactures them, i.e. usually 
the more developed countries.
When it is a question of military supplies, Algerian 
authorities are not looking for cheap, low-quality 
weapons like most developing countries, which 
absorb the arms and military equipment surplus that 
the Chinese army is getting rid of. Instead, Algeria is 
primarily looking for high-tech equipment to make 
its army one of the most modern in Africa. That is 
why the international community is worried about 
a possible collaboration with China on nuclear 
weapons dating from 1980 and continuing today. It 
has been noted that in November 2005, Jing Zhiyuan 
靖志远 – commander of the Second Artillery Corps, 
which controls the Chinese nuclear forces, and a 
member of the Military Affairs Commission – went 
to Algeria to discuss military cooperation. It has also 
been observed that in March 2008 China and Algeria 
signed a contract for the construction of a nuclear 
power plant. Western military authorities are worried 
about these activities, as they may point to Algeria’s 
nuclear ambitions (Zarnadi C., 2014:97).  
Regarding conventional weapons, the modernisation 
and professionalisation of the People’s National Army 
(PNA) was frozen during the civil war. Since 2000, it 
has been back on the political agenda. Sino-Algerian 
military relations were the least developed part 
of the relationship between both countries until 
2007, when the Algerian military forces began 
acquiring defence equipment from China, which 
is progressively becoming an important partner. 
22 See the documentation collected by the site Djazairess at http://www.
djazairess.com/fr/search?q=Skikda++Le+plus+long+tunnel+de+l’au
toroute+Est-Ouest
Algeria has obviously made an effort to diversify its 
suppliers in the sphere of defence and China appears 
to be one of the main benefi ciaries of this policy 
(Zanardi C., 2014:93-94). Military purchases from 
China have several advantages: they should reduce 
the Algerian military dependence on Russia and 
make it possible to buy less expensive but modern 
equipment. As a result, competition in the sector of 
high-tech military equipment is no longer limited 
to Russian and Western companies and opens up 
possibilities for negotiation with military equipment 
suppliers for technology transfer
Algerian policy-makers try to operate on two fronts. 
On the one hand, they tend to limit China’s presence 
to areas where there is no competition with their 
traditional partners, such as the construction sector. 
On the other hand, they are tempted to take advantage 
of China’s economic and technological performance 
to boost Algeria’s economic growth by engaging in 
Sino-Algerian joint projects. “China has expressed 
a strong will to enhance multilevel cooperation 
with Africa. That is in accordance with Algeria’s 
development strategy” claimed Abdelkader Bensalah, 
president of the Council of the Nation of Algeria 
during the Bo’ao Forum in 2013 (Li X., 2013).
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CHINE-ALGÉRIE : UNE RELATION SINGULIÈRE EN AFRIQUE
L’Algérie socialiste entretenait déjà des relations amicales 
avec la Chine maoïste, mais c’est paradoxalement dans les 
années 1990 et 2000, alors que l’Algérie abandonnait la 
référence offi cielle au socialisme, que les échanges entre 
les deux pays connaissent une expansion sans précédent, 
aux plans économique, commercial, humain..., tellement 
rapide qu’elle a pu alimenter des fantasmes sur la présence 
et les visées chinoises en Algérie. C’est cette accélération 
brutale de l’histoire des relations entre les deux pays 
qui est interrogée dans cet ouvrage. D’abord pour tenter 
d’en évaluer l’ampleur et les contours, puis, dans une 
perspective comparative, pour relativiser le phénomène 
au regard de ce qui se passe sur le continent africain, 
en distinguant les aspects contingents de cette présence 
de ceux qui s’inscrivent dans la longue durée, les traits 
singuliers de ceux que l’on retrouve ailleurs en Afrique.
中国—阿尔及利亚：在非洲的一个独特关系
社会主义时代的阿尔及利亚与毛泽东时代的中国保持
良好关系。矛盾的是在1990年和2000年期间，阿尔及
利亚官方放弃了社会主义时，而两国之间的经济、贸
易及人际关系却有了一场从没有过的发展。使中国对
阿尔及利亚的期望及影响引起了人门的幻想。本书首
先描写、评估这些关系；然后比较中国在阿尔及利亚
与在非洲大陆的异同现象。
CHINA-ALGERIA: A SINGULAR RELATIONSHIP IN AFRICA
Socialist Algeria had friendly relations with Maoist China; 
it is paradoxically during the 1990s and the 2000s, while 
Algeria abandoned the offi cial reference to socialism, 
that economic, commercial and human relations between 
the two countries began experiencing an unprecedented 
expansion in such a way that it could feed fantasies about 
the Chinese presence and expectations in Algeria. This 
book examines the sudden acceleration of the relations 
between the two countries. It aims fi rst at assessing the 
extent and outlines of these relations, then at putting 
this phenomenon into perspective relatively to what is 
taking place on the African continent; it therefore 
distinguishes casual aspects of this presence 
from those which may last more permanently, 
singular features from those which are more 
commonly met in Africa.
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